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Abstract:  
 
This study attempts to test the effect of state ownership and follow-up of audit findings in 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) owned by the government of the Republic of Indonesia, on 
the good corporate governance of SOEs.  
 
By using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) analysis, conducted by observing 98 observations 
during 2010-2014, the findings show that there are negative relationship between state 
ownership and good corporate governance implementation in SOEs in Indonesia.  
 
In addition, the results also reveal that the follow-up of audit findings positively affect the 
implementation of governance. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The performance of state enterprises in Indonesia generally has not provided an 
optimum contribution to the national economic growth and government annual 
revenue, primarily caused by the inadequacy of the implementation of Good 
Corporate Governance (GCG). Basically, Good Corporate Governance (GCG) is 
considered not only as a formality, but also as a system which is able to influence the 
value of company. The impetus for good corporate governance is very demanded for 
many Southeast Asian countries that experience overwhelmingly monetary crisis in 
the late 1990s, caused mainly by a weak implementation of corporate governance in 
public sector, monetary institutions and private companies. A research conducted by 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) identifies that the lack of corporate 
governance, particularly in Indonesia, was the main contributors of that crisis 
(Zhuang, De Dios, and Martin, 2000).  
 
Unlike previous studies arguably focusing more on the implementation of Good 
Corporate Governance as a means to improve the performance of private business 
(Chiang He & Lai, 2012; Colarossi et al., 2008) and government-owned enterprises, 
especially in developing countries (Colley et al. 2003; Zeitun, 2009; Babatunde & 
Olaniran, 2009), this study aims to analyze the effect of state ownership and the 
follow-up of the results of financial investigation on the implementation of GCG of 
State-Owned Enterprises in Indonesia. This study basically aims to provide the 
broader scope of analysis from previous study of Munawarah et al, (2017), by 
examining the role of follow-up of audit findings on the GCG practice in SOEs. 
Thus, there are two contributions of this study compared to previous studies, that are 
the need for privatization in enhancing the credibility of business management of 
SOEs; and the role of follow-up of audit findings in improving the effectiveness 
of corporate governance.  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (2005) states that 
SOEs are an important part of gross domestic product, employment and market 
capitalization of a country, especially with the acquisition of such strategic industrial 
infrastructure as energy, transportation and telecommunications. Moreover, the 
performance of SOEs has a broader segmentation as they can affect other business 
sectors. The development of an increasingly competitive global market, a more rapid 
technological advance and the deregulation of monopolistic markets have by far 
become the fundamental needs of the adjustments and restructuring of SOEs, 
including their privatization by stock offerings in the capital markets. 
 
Claessens et al. (2002) showed that the state as the controller is very concerned to 
increase the value of state-owned companies by exploiting SOEs to generate large 
dividend to increase the state revenue. On the other hand, a very large controlling 
right by the state will also be able to lead to further decline in the company value and 
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the potential occurrence of the expropriation of the minority shareholders. Therefore, 
it is necessary, regarding the existence of GCG as a set of rules, to regulate the 
activity of SOEs management to ensure the ongoing creation of the general welfare. 
In addition, GCG is expected to avoid a gap between the principal and the agent of 
government roles. Therefore, the implementation of Good Corporate Governance is 
highly demanded to limit the government roles and political interference, and to 
regulate the state ownership to create a common interest as stipulated in the basic 
guidelines for the implementation of GCG of SOEs (OECD, 2005; Ivanova and 
Bikeeva, 2016).  
 
In addition, as a basic means to protect the right of minority shareholders from 
mastery or appropriation of rights by managers and government 
as the controlling shareholder of SOEs, GCG practice is perceived to be able to 
minimize any opportunistic behaviour (Mitton, 2002; Savina, 2016; Menshchikova 
and Sayapin, 2016; Baldacchino et al., 2017; Toudas and Bellas, 2014; El-Chaarani, 
2017). The application of GCG in SOEs could reduce any behaviour possibly arising 
from government ownership. This, in turn, can help increase the company’s 
performance and value. 
 
Moreover, the role of the legislative council as a watchdog over financial 
management and the performance of SOEs is needed to create an effective 
implementation of Good Corporate Governance. Kusumawardhani (2012) finds a 
positive influence of legislative oversight, as measured by the number of parliament 
members in the Board of Commissioners, on the financial performance of local 
government. It means that a greater number of legislature will lead to a more 
effective supervisory function, that eventually results in a higher government 
financial performance. 
  
H1: State ownership has negative effect on the implementation of Good Corporate 
Governance. 
 
Auditing is one of the institutional responsibilities of both public and private 
businesses concerned mainly for pointing out the errors in financial account. The 
result of the audit findings will be very helpful in creating accountability in financial 
management (Setyaningrum et al., 2014; Pociovalisteanu and Thalassinos, 2008; 
Giannakopoulou et al., 2016). For managers of state finances, partially in Indonesia, 
the obligation to follow up the result of the audit report, as stipulated in Law 
No. 15/2004, is the responsibility of the entity or auditee. In fact, however, from 
2008 until 2012 only few recommendations (55%) of the report were followed up in 
accordance with the recommendations of the bureau, while the remaining of 45% 
was followed up not in accordance with the recommendations, that were eventually 
put in the category of non-actionable (IHPS BPK RI, 2013). 
 
Lin and Liu (2012) state that although the detection of irregularities is an important 
part of auditing, it is just the first step before others which are more important, 
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namely asking responsibility and making corrections. Therefore, high-quality 
auditors are expected to be able to generate appropriate recommendations which are 
relatively easily implemented in accordance with the company conditions. This, in 
turn, leads to a higher and more effective follow-up of audit recommendations.  
 
Claessens and Yurtoglu (2012) find that the level of state ownership and the 
diversity of corporate governance applied in each country are influenced by the 
economic diversity and financial conditions, institutional environment and 
structures, and group affiliates and investors. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find that the 
SOEs performance is influenced by corporate governance, capital structure and 
ownership structure. Xu and Wang (1999), Qiang (2003), Ang and Ding (2006) 
reveal that the SOEs governance structure is strongly influenced by the level of state 
ownership. 
 
Hence, although the ownership structure of a country is perceived to be able to have 
a direct impact on performance, there is a role of corporate governance in mediating 
this effect. Nguyen and Van Dijk (2012) demonstrate that the corporate governance 
of SOEs may reduce the level of corruption and negatively impact on 
corruption. Hence, the audit findings have an important role in highlighting the 
potential cases of corruption and mismanagement in the SOEs. Thus, the process of 
auditing is likely to be able to improve the good corporate governance of SOEs. This 
means that the auditing results are an effective means for the implementation of 
good corporate governance. 
 
Efendy (2010) notes that the audit recommendations should be followed by any 
related institutions to keep auditor motivation in pointing the fraud that 
occur. Improving the effectiveness of the recommendation is one of the strategic 
objectives apparently outlined in the business performance indicators. For auditors, 
audit finding recommendations and implementations determine the effectiveness of 
their functions and roles to encourage the quality of public sector management and 
state finance (Setyaningrum et al., 2014). Additionally, Rongbing and Yuetang 
(2010) argue that the correction or improvement efforts made by the audit 
institutions and associated parties in China related to the findings are the most 
important factors in determining the extent to which auditing bodies can perform 
transparency and promote accountability of the public sector and private company. 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between the follow-up of auditing findings and 
implementation of Good Corporate Governance. 
 
3. Methodology  
 
3.1 Sampling Method 
This study was conducted by observing the data from the period 2010-2014, by 
usingg purposive judgment sampling method. The SOEs were selected as sample 
based on several requirements. Among them, the companies must have the data on 
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the number of auditing report follow-up during the observation period, and were 
listed the value of the evaluation assessment on the application of GCG based on the 
Decree of the Ministry of State Enterprises No.SK-16/S.MBU/2012 or the Circular 
of the Ministry of State Enterprises No.S-168/MBU/2008. Moreover, the companies 
must have proprietary data of government and non-government ownership share on 
enterprises, and have a complete data related to all variables examined during the 
observation period. 
 
After several selection processes, the amount of sample was 98 SOEs, consisted of 
28 observations of public companies and 70 observations of unpublic companies. 
Among them, 17 companies was taken from 2010 data, 23 from 2011, 22 from 2012, 
27 from 2013, and 9 from 2014. Majority of sample was from transportion and 
warehousing industry with 32 observations (32.65%), followed by finance and 
insurance with 16 observations (16.33%), mining with 16 observations (12.24%), 
and  manufacture with 10 observations (10.20%). 
Empirical Model and Measurement of Variables 
To assess the proposed model, the following formula of ordinary least-square was 
used: 
GCG it = β 0 + β 1 GOV it  + β 2  AUD + ε 1                                                     (1) 
 
in which the GCG is good corporate governance measured by the scores on the 
assessment of GCG implementation based on the regulation of the Minister of SOEs, 
on the assessment conducted by either the state or independent parties. The 
assessment of the implementation of GCG after 2012 used appropriate parameters as 
specified by the Letter of Secretary of the Ministry of SOEs No.SK-16/S.MBU/2012 
on the indicators and parameters of Assessment and Evaluation of the 
Implementation of GCG in SOEs. As for the year 2011 and earlier, this study used 
the Circular Letter of the Ministry of SOEs No.S-168/MBU/2008 on the 
Implementation of GCG Practices in SOEs (Munawarah et al, 2017: 956); AUD, is 
the follow-up of the recommendations of the bureau, as measured by the percentage 
of the number of those having actually been implemented by the particular enterprise 
in accordance with the recommendation of the bureau compared to the total number 
of bureau recommendations; GOV is the government ownership in SOEs, as 
measured by the percentage of government ownership as compared to the total 
stocks. 
 
4. Results  
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The results of descriptive statistics reveal that privatized SOEs have a higher mean 
value in all the variables of the audit findings and corporate governance than those in 
non-privatized ones. This indicates that the bureau recommendation and GCG 
assessment scores for the publicly listed SOEs are higher. 
 
 
Munawarah, Muhammad Din, Fatlina Zainuddin, Harjum Muharam  
129  
Table 2. Statistic Description of Variables 
Items Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max  
Panel A: Overall Sample = 98 Observations (firm-year) 
AUD 43.568 41.24 40.602 0 100 
GOV 89.688 100 16.174 51 100 
IDX 0.285 0 0.454 0 1 
GCG 83.490 83.58 7.167 66.56 96.32 
Panel B: Privatized SOEs= 28 Observations (firm-year) 
AUD 56.893 66.186 42.213 0 100 
GOV 65.76 65.01 8.554 51 85.81 
GCG 87.169 86.725 5.919 75.68 96.32 
Panel C: Unlisted SOEs = 70 Observations (firm-year) 
AUD 38.238 25.343 38.979 0 100 
GOV 99.26 100 3.725 73.15 100 
GCG 82.018 82.1 7.128 66.559 94.62 
Source: data processed, 2016. 
 
Table 3. Test for Equality of means of AUD and GCG categorized by values of IDX 
Variable Df Value Probability 
AUD (Anova F-
test) 
41.24 40.602 100 
GCG (Anova F-
test) 
100 16.174 100 
Source: data processed, 2016. 
 
4.2 Hypothesis Testing 
H1 states that there is the effect of state ownership on the SOEs’ corporate 
governance, while H2 states the effect of follow-up of audit findings on SOEs’ 
corporate governance. The results show the effect of state ownership (GOV) and the 
follow-up of auditing reports (AUD) on the implementation of Good Corporate 
Governance (GCG). Overall, the independent variable of GCG can explain the 
variation by 18.53% percent. The results also reveal that the state ownership has a 
significant negative effect on the GCG with a negative coefficient of -.0125 at a 
significance level of 5 percent. This result indicates that hypothesis 1 is accepted, 
meaning that an increase of state ownership in SOEs can decrease state ownership 
negatively of GCG implementation. 
 
The testing also finds that the variable of following up the auditing results has a 
positive and significant influence on the implementation of GCG with a coefficient 
of 0.049 at a significance level of 5 percent. This means that the higher the following 
up of the auditing results, the higher the effectiveness of the implementation of GCG 
in SOEs. Thus, hypothesis 2 is accepted. 
 
Table 4. Hypothesis Testing 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic Prob. 
Constant 92.52061 4.001767 23.11994 0.0000 
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GOV -0.124511 0.041773 -2.980671 0.0037 
AUD 0.049041 0.016640 2.947144 0.0040 
R-square 0.185328 
Adjusted R-
square 0.168177 
F-statistic 10.80564 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000059 
AUD, is the number of follow up on the recommendations of the audit findings of the 
bureau, measured by the percentage of the number of follow-up recommendations that 
has been implemented by the state in accordance with the recommendation of the bureau 
compared to the total number of the recommendations. GOV, is the government 
shareholding in SOEs, measured by the percentage of government ownership as 
compared to total stock. GCG, is good corporate governance, measured by scores on the 
assessment of GCG implementation based on the regulation of Minister of SOEs, either 
on its own assessment conducted by state-owned or assessment by independent parties. 
Source: data processed, 2016. 
 
The testing results show that state ownership influence SOEs’ governance. This 
result is consistent with the studies of Munawarah et al. (2017), Xu and Wang 
(1999), Qiang (2003), Bhagat and Bolton (2008), Nguyen and Van Dijk (2012). 
Lisic et al. (2014) state that Chinese company largely owned by the state negatively 
affects the fraud occur at the company. Moreover, the findings of Wahyuni (2011) 
show that government ownership negatively affects the SOEs performance in 
Indonesia. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The results show that the state ownership has negative effect on corporate 
governance in SOEs.  This means that a lower level of corporate governance is likely 
to lead to an increased audit findings. The result also shows that the follow-up of 
recommendations of the bureau positively affects the implementation of Good 
Corporate Governance, highlighting the importance of following up the 
recommendations of the bureau to advance the effectiveness of the implementation 
of GCG. Moreover, the findings reveal that publicly listed SOEs have better auditing 
result and higher implementation of GCG, significantly different  with the non-listed 
enterprises. The conclusions generally imply to reduce the potential audit findings 
from the bureau and to reduce the level of state ownership by privatization 
strategies. 
 
This study also has some limitations. Even though the number of sample was 
achieved in accordance with the criteria proposed, it was still relatively small as it 
used only few number of Indonesia’s SOEs listed in the IDX. In addition, the 
model has not considered the opportunistic behaviour describing several 
characteristics of the company management and other variables that can be 
considered as control variables. Hence, these two considerations can be examined in 
further researches.  
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